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THE EXXON VALDEZ RESURFACES IN THE 
GULF OF MEXICO . . .  
AND THE HAZARDS OF “MEGASYSTEM 
CENTRIPETAL DI-POLARITY” 
Zygmunt J.B. Plater* 
Abstract: The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon blowout spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico shocked the nation with the amount of oil and harm it unleashed 
upon the Gulf and its natural and human ecosystems. As details of the ca-
lamity became available, they revealed frustrating parallels to the 1989 
Exxon Valdez oil spill in the Gulf of Alaska in terms of causation and im-
paired response capability. Similar systemic deficits characterized the ac-
tions of corporate managers and state and federal regulators in the oil 
industry of both Gulfs. In a “di-polar” system where industry and govern-
ment regulators come too close together, responsible overall manage-
ment of operations and risks suffers. The lessons and recommendations 
incorporated in the 1990 Alaska Oil Spill Commission’s Final Report on 
the Exxon Valdez spill, including watchdog citizen councils, were highly 
germane but largely ignored or forgotten in the decades between the 
Alaska Report’s  release and the 2010 BP tragedy. This Article reviews the 
Gulf of Mexico spill in light of the Gulf of Alaska spill, and notes how this 
time around we must finally learn how to deal more seriously with the 
mega-risks posed when di-polar convergences occur in these megasystems 
of hydrocarbon production and transport. 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2011, Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The au-
thor chaired the State of Alaska Oil Commission’s legal task force after the 1989 wreck of 
the M.S. Exxon Valdez. This Article is built upon a shorter piece, published as part of an 
Environmental Law Institute Report. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-
One Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Fi-
nally Address the Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska? 40 Envtl. L. Rep. 11,041, 11,041 n.2 
(2010), available at http://www.elr.info/articles/vol40/40.11041.pdf. Both pieces bene-
fited from the help, gratefully acknowledged, of two research assistants, Brendan Boyle 
and Joseph Horton, both of the Boston College Law School Class of 2012. The views ex-
pressed here, other than those cited to the Commission and other sources, are the au-
thor’s own and not those of the Commission or of my research assistants. Given the on-
rolling current events underlying this present analysis, a number of citations herein are 
necessarily given to press accounts which may be revised with further information. While 
noting this caveat, it is evident that many solid journalistic reports have come from the 
oiled waters and beaches of the Gulf, and that over time the factual record will, of course, 
be substantially deepened by historical vetting. 
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Introduction 
 Twenty-one years ago, after the calamitous Exxon Valdez oil spill in 
Alaska’s Prince William Sound, the pervasive systemic flaws—that made 
a major calamity in the Gulf of Alaska not just possible, but probable1— 
were largely cloaked behind the figure of a captain with a drinking 
problem.2 By any analysis, the Gulf of Mexico calamity, almost twenty 
times larger than the Exxon Valdez spill,3 was, like the 1989 spill, a sys-
temic dysfunction resulting from marked shortcomings of industry and 
government regulation in multiple aspects of the overall oil production 
and transport process, not an exceptional anomaly attributable to just 
one well, one company, or one dereliction. 4 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n, Final Report: SPILL: The Wreck of the Exxon Val-
dez: Implications for Safe Transport of Oil 206 (1990) [hereinafter Alaska Comm’n 
Report], available at http://www.arlis.org/docs/vol1/B/33339870.pdf. The Alaska Commis-
sion issued an extensive final report with appendices, available through the Alaska Resources 
Library and Information Services website, http://www.arlis.org/docs/vol2/a/EVOS_FAQs. 
pdf. 
2 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 7. 
3 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the Exxon Valdez 
Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally Address the Systemic Flaws Re-
vealed in Alaska? 40 Envtl. L. Rep. 11,041, 11,041 n.2 (2010), available at http://www. 
elr.info/articles/vol40/40.11041.pdf. The Exxon Valdez spill is generally reported as hav-
ing released approximately 250,000 barrels, or almost eleven million gallons, of crude oil. 
See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at iii. Estimates of the total oil released in the 
Gulf have been contentious; however, the government now estimates that the BP Deepwa-
ter blowout spill appears to have released roughly five million barrels, at a rate between 
50,000 to 60,000 barrels per day from April 20, 2010, until a top cap was applied on July 
15, 2010. See Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore 
Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling 
146–47, 167 (2011) [hereinafter BP Commission Report]. It appears that BP will chal-
lenge this estimate because, among other reasons, fines are based on the total oil released. 
See Robert L. Cavnar, BP Wins: EPA Will Agree to Cut Oil Spill Estimate, Huffington Post 
(Feb. 2, 2011, 9:07 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-l-cavnar/bp-wins-epa-will- 
agree-to_b_817327.html. 
4 Though the systemic similarities of the two spills are the focus of this analysis, it should 
be noted that there are marked physical differences between the two spills. No oil spill, of 
course, like no coastal setting, is exactly like any other. The shores of coastal Alaska are very 
different from the reedy marshes and beaches of the Gulf coast in ecology and climate. Oiled 
sandy beaches may be easier to clean than cobbled stone beaches where the oil penetrates 
deeply. Marshes, however, are far more problematic. Plater, supra note 3, at 11,042 & n.5. 
Warmer temperatures can break down oil faster. Cassie Rodenberg, How Oil Breaks Down in 
Water, Popular Mechanics (May 7, 2010, 11:21 AM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/ 
science/energy/coal-oil-gas/oil-spill-water-chemistry. The winds and currents of the Gulf of 
Mexico are more complex than in the Gulf of Alaska. See Pete Spotts, Gulf Oil Spill Driven by 
Complex Ocean Currents and Eddies, Christian Sci. Monitor, May 15, 2010, http://www. 
csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0515/Gulf-spill-oil-driven-by-complex-ocean-currents-and-eddies. 
The Exxon Valdez oil spill soiled a coastal impact zone inhabited by no more than 
30,000 people, with a sparse economy and only one state jurisdiction. Plater, supra note 3, 
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 The system of oil production and transport in the Gulf of Mexico 
area, as in Alaska, is a sprawling, complex, multi-corporation, multi-
agency megasystem, presenting multiplied points of risk and magnified 
potential for a mega-catastrophe.5 
 The central proposition of this Article, and a primary recommen-
dation of the State of Alaska Oil Spill Commission in 1990, is that 
megasystems, with the potential for mega-catastrophe, require signifi-
cant expansion of institutional perspectives beyond the traditional de-
fault configuration of public-private industry governance.6 The stan-
dard governance design in modern society, including governance of 
megasystems like the oil production and transportation sphere, is im-
plicitly a “di-polar” arrangement7—a public-private societal governing 
structure comprised of two theoretically counter-balancing establish-
ments. On one side are the industry players in the marketplace, gener-
ating jobs, technology, wealth, and political power. On the other side 
are regulatory agencies, state and federal, tasked with monitoring the 
industry and protecting the public from industry’s market failure ex-
ternalities. As the Exxon Valdez spill revealed, however, and as decades 
                                                                                                                      
at 11,042. The Gulf of Mexico’s affected coastal impact zone is home to nearly fourteen 
million people—if including the coastal impact zone population of Texas—with a complex 
coast-oriented economy in five separate states. U.S. Census Bureau, P25-1139, Coastline 
Population Trends in the United States: 1960 to 2008, at 9 (2010). In the Gulf of 
Mexico the defendants’ financial liability is likely to be commensurately much larger than 
Exxon’s payout in Alaska. Plater, supra note 3, at 11,042. Exxon paid roughly $5 billion—
compensatory settlements of $507.5 million paid to private and municipal plaintiffs, which 
doubled in punitive damages after Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008), $30 million 
in interest, criminal fines of $25 million, plus $125 million in criminal restitution, $900 
million in civil settlement with Alaska and the United States, and approximately $2.4 bil-
lion in remediation expenses. Some of these amounts appear to have been covered by 
insurance or offsets. A precedent-setting Exxon Valdez “re-opener” clause was triggered in 
2006 by Alaska’s request for an additional $92 million for ecological damages. See Plater, 
supra note 3, at 11,042 & n.6. See generally William H. Rodgers, Jr. et al., The Exxon Valdez 
Reopener: Natural Resources Damage Settlements and Roads Not Taken, 22 Alaska L. Rev. 135 
(2005) (urging the State of Alaska and the United States to seek enforcement of the re-
opener clause). 
5 BP Played Central Role in Botched Containment of 1989 Exxon Valdez Disaster, Democracy Now 
(May 26, 2010), http://www.democracynow.org/2010/5/26/bp_played_central_role_in_botched. 
6 See generally Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at v, 129, 139–40. 
7 I have adapted the description of the standard model of traditional modern societal 
governance as “di-polar,” from a phrase used by Professor Lon Fuller in a slightly different 
context. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 383 
(1978); Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Dealing with Dumb and Dumber: The Continuing Mission of Citizen 
Environmentalism, 20 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 25 (2005). On one pole is the market dynamo 
that drives our economy, generating innovation, wealth, jobs, culture, and negative exter-
nalities like pollution as well—and on the other, government agencies hold the primary 
role and responsibility of counterbalancing the excesses of the marketplace economy. 
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of political scientists have described as “iron triangles”8 and “agency 
capture,”9 the counter-balancing “poles” too often incline centripetal-
ly10 into each other. The industry and agency players are too easily 
pulled together into a combined culture of complacency, collusion, 
and neglect.11 
 The major oil spill calamities in the two Gulfs have demonstrated 
that the standard di-polar governance model for oil megasystems pro-
                                                                                                                      
8 The concept of “iron triangles” is a political science rubric that offers broad utility in 
understanding how modern government in reality functions, which often doesn’t resem-
ble the process described in civics textbooks. “Iron triangles” are formed by the relation-
ship among a regulated industry, the governmental agency (or agencies), and the bloc of legislators 
that hold especially strong affinities for that industry sector, typically served by a special-
ized cadre of lobbyists. See, e.g., Fred Powledge, Water: The Nature, Uses, and Future 
of Our Most Precious and Abused Resource 286–89 (1982). Each point of the triangle 
looks out for and serves the other two points in political and economic terms. See id. The 
narrowed, focused interests of each of these triangles creates a powerful political status 
quo in their sector of governance, each point of the triangle motivated by its own intricate 
system of rewards. See id. In government as well as geometry, triangles are the strongest of 
all geometric shapes. The “iron triangle” term has useful descriptive application in a wide 
variety of special interest settings, some more benign than others. See id. There are iron 
triangles for mining, timber, chemicals, ranching and rangelands, highway construction, 
public works pork barrels, the defense procurement industry, as well as for education, 
medicine and hospitals, sewage treatment, NASA, and more. See id. 
9 In political science, “agency capture” is a well-known tendency of industry-agency 
convergence, and is part of the iron triangle phenomenon. A regulatory agency created in 
the fervor of a popular movement to regulate some designated problem may begin its life 
energetically pursuing the overall public interest, but over time its initiative gradually may 
be eroded into narrower views, intimately linked with the industry and problems it was 
intended to solve. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1684–87 (1975). Justice William O. Douglas said that “as I told my old 
friend, . . . Franklin Delano Roosevelt, . . . he should make every regulatory agency termi-
nate after ten years. That’s all the time they’ll have to be effective before they are tamed.” 
The author recalls Justice Douglas saying this to a class of his at the University of Tennes-
see (spring semester 1974); according to the author’s recollection, on other occasions 
Douglas reportedly stated the optimal agency lifetime as five years, not ten. 
10 Centripetally: “moving or tending to move toward a center.” Oxford American 
Dictionary and Thesaurus 225 (2003). 
11 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 5, 186, 205–06. 
[A] general complacency had come to permeate the operation and oversight 
of the entire system. . . . Privatization and self-regulation in oil transportation 
contributed to the complacency and neglect that helped cause the wreck of 
the Exxon Valdez. . . . Success bred complacency; complacency bred neglect; 
neglect increased the risk—until the right combination of errors finally led to 
an accident of disastrous proportions. All parties—the shippers, Alyeska, the 
Coast Guard and the State of Alaska—shared in the complacency that pro-
duced this result. . . . [There was] a low level of vigilance and a discomforting 
level of comfort between the industry and Coast Guard regulators. State regu-
lation had been withdrawn. 
Id. 
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duces a complex but poorly coordinated, insufficiently vigilant, risk-
prone plexus that cannot be relied upon for human or ecological 
safety. This failing is only multiplied as drilling pushes ever farther and 
deeper to develop hydrocarbons. 
 To reform the problematic inertias observed within the Alaska oil 
megasystem, the Alaska Commission made fifty-nine substantial rec-
ommendations, more than half of them relevant to oil megasystems 
beyond Alaska.12 One of the more significant recommendations was 
the call for creation of unique citizen councils.13 The Commission 
urged that the traditional public-private management arrangement be 
significantly expanded by institutionalizing a savvy citizen watchdog 
presence within the system—regional citizen advisory councils 
(RCACs).14 The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA-90) incorporated that 
recommendation for Alaska waters,15 and the experience of RCACs in 
Alaska shows the promise and the challenges of integrating citizen ac-
on.
poses to bring the innovative RCAC con-
pt
Alaska Commission recommendations that were partially incorporated 
                                                                                                                     
ti 16 
 The Commission’s innovative recommendation to create RCACs 
not only changed the public management perspectives of oil produc-
tion and transport in Alaska,17 it also provides a potentially instructive 
model for managing oil production and other industrial megasystems 
in modern industrial democracies. Properly designed and imple-
mented, RCACs provide a pluralistic structural design for governing, 
breaking up the centripetal tendencies of the usual agency-industry di-
polar system. The 2011 Report to the President by the National Com-
mission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 
(“National Commission”) pro
ce  to the Gulf of Mexico.18 
 The hard systemic lessons learned twenty-one years ago in Alaska 
were largely forgotten or diluted over subsequent years, even the few 
 
12 See id. at 129–71. 
13 See id. at 139–40 (Recommendation 12). 
14 See id. at 131 (Recommendation 3); see also id. at 139–40, 146, 163 (Recommenda-
tions 12, 26, and 49). 
15 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d) (2006). 
16 See infra Part III. 
17 Joseph Horton, Citizen Watchdogs: Insulating Regional Citizen Advisory Councils—
Lessons Learned from the RCACs of Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet, D.105, at 3–5 
(Nov. 5, 2010) (unpublished research memorandum), available at http://www.bc.edu/enviro- 
nmentallaw (follow “Boston College Law School Land & Environmental Law Program Sub-
mission to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling” hyperlink). 
18 See BP Commission Report, supra note 3, at 212, 268–69, 281. 
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into OPA-90.19 The question for national energy law and policy now is 
whether, this time around, we will acknowledge and implement the les-
sons for hard systemic change largely avoided two decades ago. There 
are many promising areas for reform, as noted in the work of the Na-
tional Commission.20 The innovative RCACs constitute one significant 
potential improvement in the oil megasystem. The Deepwater Horizon 
tragedy will be a doubly disastrous occasion if it does not produce sys-
temic changes for the future, as the Exxon Valdez spill markedly failed 
to do. As White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel said in another 
context, “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste.” 21 
I. Megasystems 
 Analyzing the role of oil production and transport in the life of 
modern society, the Alaska Commission described its broad and deep 
complexity as a “megasystem”: 
[The world’s oil companies] have created a megasystem that 
carries oil from wellheads in the far corners of the earth to re-
fineries in its major industrial centers. But this megasystem is 
fragile. It requires careful scrutiny from outside the industry 
in design, construction and operation. When it fails . . . entire 
coastlines are at risk. 
 . . . Alaskans assume such peril daily . . . . Other Americans 
on three coasts face just as ominous a threat . . . . 
 What will reduce these risks? Obviously, the present system, 
providing minimum penalties for creating massive environ-
mental damage, has not deterred the industry from putting 
the coasts and oceans of the world at continual risk. The sys-
tem calls out for reform. The mission of this commission is to 
explain what must be done and why.22 
 The BP blowout in the Gulf reflects virtually the same intercon-
nected megasystem complexities and the same lack of unitary over-
sight, inconsistent vigilance, and shortcutting as revealed in Alaska in 
the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill. The Alaska Commission con-
cluded that the tragic incident was not primarily attributable to a cap-
                                                                                                                      
19 Joe Stephens, Lessons from Exxon Valdez Spill Have Gone Unheeded, Wash. Post, July 14, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/13/AR2010071306291.html. 
20 See BP Commission Report, supra note 3, at 249–91. 
21 Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 2008, at A2. 
22 Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at v. 
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tain’s drinking, but rather that an accident of that nature and caliber 
was probably inevitable.23 As the Alaska Commission concluded, the 
Exxon Valdez spill was the predictable result of a megasystem that had 
developed a pervasive culture of complacency, collusion, and neglect.24 
But for the most part these lessons were subsequently forgotten or di-
luted.25 As the Alaska Commission gathered research and evidence in 
the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill, however, the commissioners 
were repeatedly confronted with examples of deficiencies throughout 
the corporate and governmental management of the sprawling inter-
connected aggregation of elements that was the Alaska oil enterprise.26 
 The Alaska Commission’s report, instead of merely focusing on 
the 1989 calamity’s tanker transport element as initially planned, ulti-
mately addressed issues that presented serious risks throughout all 
stages of the oil production and transport process. Problematic con-
cerns were identified stretching from the various oil production areas 
on Alaska’s North Slope, across 800 miles of pipeline and pumping sta-
tions, across three mountain ranges, to the large tank farm holding fa-
cilities, onto the wharves—where tanker loading crews had been cut 
back to save money—and along a 2000-mile tanker route to refineries 
at Long Beach, California.27 Throughout that megasystem, risky cost-
                                                                                                                      
 
23 See id. at 7 (“It was the result of the gradual degradation of oversight and safety prac-
tices that had been intended, 12 years before, to safeguard and backstop the inevitable 
mistakes of human beings.”). 
24 See id. at 206. 
25 Stephens, supra note 19. 
26 See generally Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 129–71 (Findings and Rec-
ommendations). The deficiencies are noted throughout the Report text and reflected in 
the Recommendations as deficits requiring reform: the need to compensate for deficiency 
in prevention safety prioritizing (see Recommendation 1, 2, 4, 6, 8); the need for best 
available technology in corporate and agency implementation (Recommendation 7); the 
need for better state agency vigilance over corporate practices (Recommendations 10, 14–
17, 25, 43–46); the need for better federal agency presence in overseeing corporate prac-
tices (Recommendations 29–31); deficiencies in environmental safety reporting (Recom-
mendation 33); and deficiencies in governmental and corporate incident response plan-
ning (Recommendations 14, 18, 22, 38–45, 48–51). See id. 
27 See id. at 5; Pipeline Facts, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, http://www.alyeska-
pipe.com/pipelinefacts.html (last updated May 28, 2010). According to the Alaska Com-
mission’s Chairman and Executive Director, the Commission found deficiencies through-
out the oil extraction and transport megasystem, and that is why the commissioners ulti-
mately widened the focus from just addressing tanker transport. “But I wish we’d gotten 
more about pipelines into OPA-90,” said the Chairman. Telephone Interview with Walter 
Parker, Chairman, Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n (Mar. 17, 2011); see also Telephone Interview 
with John E. Havelock, Exec. Dir., Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n (Mar. 17, 2011). 
A rough map graphic submitted to the Alaska Commission by the Boston College Exxon 
Valdez student research group, and used in some of the Commission discussions, illustrated 
the different interconnected sectors that constituted an integrated system with risks (often 
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cutting by Alyeska, the industry consortium—dominated in fact by 
BP28—that ran the Alaska oil system, and the acquiescence of under-
vigilant government agencies, driven by profits, politics, and the neces-
sities of oil supply, made breakdowns in operations and response possi-
ble.29 
 As on-going investigations in the aftermath of the BP Deepwater 
Horizon blowout spill have revealed, there are fragilities and serious 
points of risk throughout the Gulf of Mexico oil megasystem as well,30 
and not just for wells at great depth. The BP Deepwater Horizon blow-
out was not an exceptional anomaly.31 Here is the apparent syllogism: 
the greater the size, complexity, and technical sophistication of the ele-
ments of a megasystem, the greater the risk of mega-catastrophe—and 
the greater the need for extreme vigilance in design, coordination, and 
operation. Yet the bigger such megasystems become, the harder it is for 
corporate managers and government agencies alike to see, keep track 
of, and manage the cumulative mass of critical points of risk. Likewise, 
the bigger the megasystem, the greater the daily internal economic and 
political pressures to maximize short-term benefits, and, perversely, to 
fractionalize vigilance. 
                                                                                                                      
including catastrophic risks) throughout. See Bos. College Law Sch. Land & Envtl L. Program, 
Submission to the Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, 
app. D.100 (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://www.bc.edu/environmentallaw (follow “Boston 
College Law School Land & Environmental Law Program Submission to the National Com-
mission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling” hyperlink). 
28 BP, at the time of the Exxon Valdez spill, had a 50.01% controlling interest within 
the seven-corporation Alyeska consortium, which meant that the Alyeska consortium’s 
operational decisions, much criticized by the Alaska Commission report, were driven by 
BP’s majority position. See Noaki Schwartz, BP Had a Key Role in the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 
ABC News, May 25, 2010, http://www.pottsmerc.com/articles/2010/05/25/news/doc4b 
fbbfae49ac8813211300.txt. 
29 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, A Modern Political Tribalism in Natural Resources Management, 
11 Pub. Land L. Rev. 1, 6–10 (1990). These cost-cutting, risk-enhancing measures con-
tributed substantially to causing the Alaska spill, including the exhaustion of tanker crew 
personnel and inadequate radar, and to major deficiencies in response capabilities after 
the spill occurrence. Id.; see also Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 35 (“Although 
the U.S. Coast Guard promised to push for both systems, by the time the oil was flowing in 
1977 the agency had not installed either full-coverage radar or any other electronic surveil-
lance in the sound.”). 
30 See BP Commission Report, supra note 3, at vii, 2, 62, 71, 78–83, 140, 174–96. 
31 See id. at 122. The Commission found that the Minerals Management Service (MMS) 
lacked the resources, experience, and training to adequately ensure safe oil platform op-
erations. Id. at 57, 126–27. The “root causes [of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill] are 
systemic and, absent significant reform in both industry practices and government poli-
cies, might well recur. The missteps were rooted in systemic failures by industry manage-
ment (extending beyond BP to contractors that serve the industry), and also by failures of 
government to provide effective regulatory oversight of offshore drilling.” Id. at 122–23. 
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 In the Gulf of Mexico region, fractionalized and less-than-vigilant 
government management practices appear to have been pervasive, 
paralleling insufficient industry operational practices. State and federal 
agencies exhibited negligence and lassitude toward operations of all 
the oil companies in the Gulf, not just BP.32 Critical geological informa-
tion was routinely insufficiently available to permitting authorities and 
oversight monitors.33 The various oil production transport systems— 
tankers, lighters, and pipelines—have broadly posed their own prob-
lems of safety and environmental threat and have not been adequately 
factored into the regulatory process.34 And the risks are synergistic. For 
example, the construction and maintenance of pipelines and transit 
canals through barrier islands and Delta lands, to service hundreds of 
near-shore oil operations—between 9000 and 10,000 miles of channeli-
zation in Louisiana—has been virtually unaccounted for in oil permit-
ting, but was a major reason why Hurricanes Katrina and Rita found 
coastal populations so unprotected.35 
II. The Hazards of Megasystem Centripetal Di-Polarity 
The commission found a low level of vigilance and a discomforting level of 
comfort between the industry and Coast Guard regulators. State regulation 
had been withdrawn.36 
A. Patterns of Preparation Failure: Alaska to the Gulf of Mexico 
 The preconditions for destructive discharges from oil megasystems 
can lie latent within the process of planning, permitting, constructing, 
                                                                                                                      
32 Plater, supra note 3, at 11,042. 
33 Eric French et al., Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information, D.128, at 2 (Nov. 5, 
2010) (unpublished research memorandum), available at http://www.bc.edu/environmental 
law (follow “Boston College Law School Land & Environmental Law Program Submission to 
the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling” 
hyperlink). 
34 Oliver A. Houck, Down on the Batture 205 (2010); Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in 
Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 3, 25–28 (1983). The 
serious social externalities of oil industry practices in Louisiana are illustrated in the famous 
Testbank case. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985). 
35 See Melanie MacWilliams-Brooks et al., Categorical Exclusions from EIS, D.107, at 4–5 
(Nov. 5, 2010) (unpublished research memorandum), available at http://www.bc.edu/envi- 
ronmentallaw (follow “Boston College Law School Land & Environmental Law Program 
Submission to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Off-
shore Drilling” hyperlink); see also Joel Sartore, Image 1346387 of Official National Geographic 
Prints Store, Nat’l Geographic, http://gallery.pictopia.com/natgeo/photo/9190416/ (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011) (depicting canals carved through Louisiana wetlands). 
36 Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 186. 
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and operating oil drilling systems, and designing insufficient precau-
tionary safeguards. In Alaska the 1990 Commission noted that the entire 
system had been developed with shortcuts and a primary focus on pro-
duction rather than safety.37 The official state and local regulatory agen-
cies often uncritically accepted industry data and assurances on the de-
sign and safety of system elements, issued permits without required 
documentation, did not insist on strict compliance with corporate and 
federal rules, and, on occasions when they attempted to assert regula-
tory vigilance, were resisted, delayed, or overturned by the industry’s 
greater resources and political momentum.38 The “revolving door” be-
tween industry and regulators produced what political science describes 
as agency capture.39 
 As the Alaska Oil Spill Commission investigations revealed, the Aly-
eska Owners’ Committee, led by BP, systematically cut back on critical 
safety measures.40 The Alyeska Owners’ Committee successfully pres-
sured the U.S. Coast Guard to accept a variety of regulatory changes, 
including: making the Sound’s vehicle separation zone voluntary rather 
than mandatory;41 loosening agreed-upon requirements for industry-
financed, high-resolution radar systems;42 firing the around-the-clock 
                                                                                                                      
 
37 See id. at 34–36. 
38 See generally id. at 34–59. At the commencement of the pipeline, the State of Alaska 
passed a protective statute establishing stricter standards for tanker safety and pollution 
avoidance. In response, the industry’s management consortium successfully attacked most 
of the law on preemption grounds in federal district court. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Hammond, No. A 77-195, 1978 A.M.C. 1697, 1712–14 (D. Alaska June 30, 1978), rev’d, 
Chevron U.S.A., et al. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984). The state only appealed 
some minor provisions of the law, which were deemed unpreempted by the Ninth Circuit. 
Chevron, 726 F.2d at 501. 
39 See Stewart, supra note 9, at 1684–87. 
40 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 7 (“[O]ne basic conclusion of this re-
port is that the grounding at Bligh Reef represents much more than the error of a possibly 
drunken skipper: It was the result of the gradual degradation of oversight and safety prac-
tices that had been intended, 12 years before, to safeguard and backstop the inevitable 
mistakes of human beings.”). 
41 Though depicted as sharp vessel separation corridors on the nautical chart of Prince 
William Sound, the separation zone is not mandatory. See id. at 8–9. The author was in-
formed during Commission investigations that under the 1980 Inland Navigation Rules, 
the separation zone for Prince William Sound had not been designated as a mandatory 
lane divider. Under current regulations, vessel separation zones are now generally manda-
tory. See 33 C.F.R. § 83.10 (2010). 
42 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 35; supra note 29 and accompanying 
text. Requirements for higher-quality radar had been reduced at industry’s request to 
permit the utilization of less expensive radar systems, despite initial assurances that best 
available radar technology would be installed. Interview with Havelock, supra note 27. 
“When I was Attorney General [representatives of industry and the U.S. Coast Guard] 
assured me that BAT for radar would be installed in Prince William Sound. It wasn’t. It was 
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expert loading crews at the Valdez Marine Terminal to save $10 million 
a year in costs, thereby forcing ships’ crews to take on the exhausting 
and delicate job of loading their tankers carefully to avoid structural fail-
ure;43 and excusing industry from having to fund a rapid response sta-
tion on Hinchinbrook Island—which could have quickly accessed the 
Exxon Valdez on Bligh Reef and captured virtually all the discharged oil 
before it got caught up by wind and currents.44 And when the big one 
occurred, the megasystem’s failure to prepare for a major spill was 
grimly evident. 
 Similar complacency and inappropriate collusion is increasingly 
revealed in narrative details from the Gulf of Mexico oil production sys-
tem.45 Regulators and those being regulated operated together in sym-
biotic relationships reflecting the fact that they considered themselves 
part of the same unitary community.46 Deepwater drilling at unprece-
dented depths was undertaken with casual oversight and lax require-
ments for drill plans.47 Categorical exclusions from full environmental 
reviews were granted for deepwater drilling, and the potential for blow-
                                                                                                                      
lousy technology.” Id. (Commission Executive Director Havelock served as Attorney Gen-
eral for the State of Alaska from 1970 to 1973). 
43 See Plater, supra note 29, at 7. 
44 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 39. Incidents in Prince William Sound 
could have been addressed more rapidly and directly if the planned Hinchinbrook Island 
response station existed: 
The need to deploy equipment to a spill from several locations rather than 
just from the Valdez terminal began to receive consideration in late Decem-
ber. Rear Adm. J.B. Hayes, Commander 17th Coast Guard District, provided 
the sharpest initial focus in a Dec. 28, 1976, letter to A.P. Rollins, Jr., the chief 
federal pipeline officer. Hayes noted that response times for vessels stationed 
in Valdez to a spill in Hinchinbrook Entrance had been determined to be 
seven to eight hours. “It is strongly recommended that Alyeska preposition 
appropriate response resources in the vicinity of Hinchinbrook Entrance.” Al-
though similar recommendations followed and became more specific, Alyeska 
never responded. 
Id. 
45 Reports indicate that the MMS officials and industry personnel enjoyed social ex-
cursions together—often in improperly close relationships characterized as “a culture of 
ethical failure,” “a culture of substance abuse and promiscuity,” and “a pattern of abuses 
and mismanagement.” Charlie Savage, Sex, Drug Use and Graft Cited in Interior Department, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 2008, at A1. 
46 See Jason DeParle, Leading the Way Into Deep Water, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2010, at A1. 
“‘Obviously we’re all oil industry,’ said Larry Williamson, the [MMS] district manager. 
‘We’re all from the same part of the country. Almost all our inspectors have worked for oil 
companies. . . . They grew up in the same towns.’” Id. 
47 See Randy Lee Loftis, Risks of Deep-water Drilling get Brush-off, Anchorage Daily News, 
( July 15, 2010, 7:51 AM), http://adn.com/2010/07/01/1349546/depper-oil-wells-in-gulf-
pose.html. 
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outs deemed virtually impossible, ignoring data showing that blowout 
preventers are prone to failure.48 Monitoring and enforcement of regu-
lations was haphazard.49 If violations were assessed, they were vigorously 
contested to burden and deter further enforcement.50 
 Internally, corporate management decisions can too easily be 
based on short-term economic gain. Despite high-hazard locations, 
great technological challenges, and high-risk potentials, operations de-
cisions over time are likely to be managed in business terms, dominated 
by shareholder and managerial expectations of high revenues, rather 
than public concern for human and ecosystem safety.51 Internal corpo-
rate culture is likely to be dominated by whatever the dominant part-
ner’s corporate agenda and policies may be. Compounding this struc-
ture is a chief shortcoming—industry typically maintains its strict right 
to hold company information confidential, even where that data is of 
critical public importance.52 
                                                                                                                      
 
48 See David Barstow et al., Between Blast and Spill, One Last, Flawed Hope, N.Y. Times, 
June 21, 2010, at A1; DeParle, supra note 46. 
49 See, e.g., Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 47 (noting that Alyeska’s contin-
gency plan met “‘regulation requirements on paper’” but would have failed a “‘reality 
test’” (citation omitted)); id. at 58–59 (finding that no effective enforcement policy was 
available beyond shutting down the pipeline). 
50 BP’s stance over the years was typified by its contesting safety violations in the Texas 
City explosions and otherwise. See Press Release, BP, BP Texas City Refinery Formally Con-
tests OSHA Citations (Oct. 30, 2010), available at http://www.bp.com/genericarticle. 
do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7057595; David Batty, BP to Pay $50m Fine For Safety 
Violations After Texas City Explosion, Guardian (London), Aug. 12, 2010, http://www.guard- 
ian.co.uk/business/2010/aug/12/bp-texas-city-explosion-fine (“BP initially contested pay-
ing the entire amount . . . .”); Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Valuing Safety is Good for Companies’ 
Bottom Line, Atlantic (Apr. 19, 2010, 10:40 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2010/04/valuing-safety-is-good-for-companies-bottom-line/39128/ (“In October 2009, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration announced it was levying an $87 mil-
lion fine against BP for failing to correct problems which caused the 2005 explosion; BP is 
contesting those charges.”). 
51 See Ravi Somaiya, The Road to Deepwater Horizon: BP’s Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico Was a 
Disaster Three Decades in the Making, Newsweek, July 13, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/ 
2010/07/13/the-road-to-deepwater-horizon.html (discussing the tension between “profits 
and safety” at BP during the time leading up to the spill). See generally Vsevolod Tatarenkov, 
Supplement to Research Memo No. 102, at 6–10 (Nov. 19, 2010) (unpublished research 
memorandum), available at http://www.bc.edu/environmentallaw (follow “Boston College 
Law School Land & Environmental Law Program Submission to the National Commission on 
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling” hyperlink) (reporting a partial 
catalog of risk-enhancing operational decisions in the Alaska setting). 
52 For example, during the “mad cow” scare involving Creuzfeldt-Jakob disease in beef, 
government agencies were pressured: 
to keep secret the names of the retail outlets selling food subject to recalls. 
This agreement left consumers essentially in the dark, unable to protect 
themselves and their families from the possibility of ingesting contaminated 
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 BP may have been particularly prone to cutting corners in its 
dominance of the Alyeska management company and in the Gulf,53 but 
the comfortable relationships with the Interior Department’s Minerals 
Management Service (MMS), and its lax oversight were shared by all 
the Gulf drilling companies.54 In Louisiana especially, and to a lesser 
extent in other Gulf States, oil is king and close accommodation with 
the oil industry at the state as well as federal level was standard operat-
ing procedure.55 
B. Failures in Response Plans 
 In the circumstances of their post-calamity responses as well, the 
two oil disasters, two decades apart, reveal distressingly similar systemic 
failures in response preparation and implementation. Contingency 
plans are the heart of response effectiveness, and in both cases the offi-
cial contingency plans were largely fiction. The BP Gulf of Mexico plan 
notoriously included consideration of walruses, not found south of Se-
attle,56 minimized the possibility of a blowout, and wildly exaggerated 
the practicability of discharge capture and cleanup.57 The official 
                                                                                                                      
 
meat. The USDA and DHS actions suggest that protecting the “proprietary 
information” of the meat industry is of greater importance than protecting 
public health and the safety of the food supply. 
Elisa Obadashian, Senior Policy Analyst, Consumers Union, Testimony Before the Califor-
nia Legislature on Mad Cow Disease (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www.consumers 
union.org/pub/core_food_safety/000879.html; see also French et al., supra note 33, at 2–3. 
53 See Schwartz, supra note 28. 
54 See DeParle, supra note 46. BP was not the only oil company in the Gulf that enjoyed 
lax enforcement including blanket categorical exemptions from environmental review. For 
Gulf of Mexico projects generally, MMS had been granting between 250 and 400 waivers a 
year. Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Exempted BP’s Gulf of Mexico Drilling From Environmental Impact Study, 
Wash. Post, May 5, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/ 
05/04/AR2010050404118.html. The reported industry-agency improprieties did not single 
out BP as an exception. See Savage, supra note 45. 
55 See DeParle, supra note 46. For example, after Katrina it was apparent that a major 
contributor to inland flooding and the destruction of buffering coastal marshes was the 
9000 miles of oil industry canals cut through coastal marshes to serve drilling operations, 
but this fact was generally not mentioned. See Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana, supra 
note 34, at 26, 75–78; Oliver Houck, Who Will Pay to Fix Louisiana?, Nation, July 12, 2010, 
at 11 (describing Louisiana’s reliance on the oil and gas industry); MacWilliams-Brooks et 
al., supra note 35, at 6. 
56 Walruses in Louisiana? Eyebrow-Raising Details of BP’s Spill Response Plan, Reuters, May 
27, 2010, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/environment/2010/05/27/walruses-in-louis- 
iana-eyebrow-raising-details-of-bps-spill-response-plan/. 
57 See Cain Burdeau & Holbrook Mohr, BP Downplayed Possibility of Major Oil Spill, Bos-
ton.com, May 1, 2010, available at http://www.boston.com/news/science/articles/2010/ 
05/01/bp_downplayed_possibility_of_major_oil_spill/; Holbrook Mohr et al., BP Spill 
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Alaska plan had failed within forty-eight hours; a generic default Exxon 
corporate plan had to be brought in.58 Although recommendations 
were made and we had the opportunity to learn from Alaska, twenty 
years later the command structure in the Gulf of Mexico was uncertain, 
with state and federal representatives stepping on one another’s toes 
and BP not under their command and control.59 
 The Alaska Commission focused on the need for designing and 
implementing a decisive and unified incident command, a call that 
OPA-90’s National Contingency Plan essentially avoided in practice.60 
In addition to asserting the need for governmental command authority 
over industry equipment and personnel, the Commission called for 
shifting oil spill containment and cleanup responsibilities to the Army 
Corps of Engineers if the Coast Guard proved incapable of asserting 
                                                                                                                      
Response Plans Severely Flawed, MSNBC, June 9, 2010, available at http://www.msnbc.msn. 
com/id/37599810/ns/disaster_in_the_gulf/ (“There weren’t supposed to be any coastline 
problems because the site was far offshore. ‘Due to the distance to shore (48 miles) and 
the response capabilities that would be implemented, no significant adverse impacts are 
expected,’ the site plan says.”). Attention to preparation for dealing with a large blowout, 
not to mention a blowout at mile-depths, would seem an obvious concern given the well-
known and destructive Ixtoc blowout in the Gulf’s Bay of Campeche in 1979. See Ramon 
Antonio Vargas, 1979's Ixtoc Oil Well Blowout in Gulf of Mexico Has Startling Parallels to Current 
Disaster, Times-Picayune ( July 4, 2010, 10:44 AM), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-
spill/index.ssf/2010/07/1979s_ixtoc_oil_well_blowout_i.html. 
58Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 161, app. N at 1–2 (detailing a timeline of 
days two and three of the spill). 
59 In contingency plans, equipment and funding are the responsibility of the industry 
rather than the federal taxpayer. See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 156 (“Recom-
mendation 38: Government in Charge. The spiller should not be in charge of response to a 
major spill. A spiller should be obligated to respond with all the resources it can summon, 
but government should command that response.”); id. at 162 (“Recommendation 48: Inci-
dent Command System. “A formal command structure known as the Incident Command 
System should be used to direct [the industry-provided] response to oil spills.”). The Oil Spill 
Liability Trust Fund, the primary institutional source of spill response funding, is funded by 
industry penalties, liability assessments, taxes, and fees. See 26 U.S.C. § 9509(b) (2006). As the 
Alaska Commission noted, command must be governmental, yet when the U.S. EPA com-
mand ordered BP to sharply restrict the use of Corexit dispersants, BP demurred, persuading 
the Coast Guard to allow continued extensive use. See David A. Fahrenthold & Steven Muf-
son, Documents Indicate Heavy Use of Dispersants in Gulf Oil Spill, Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/31/AR2010073102381. 
html. 
60 Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 162; see 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (2006). Imple-
mentation of the National Incident Management System often reflected disorganization and 
insufficient preparation. See Jim McKay, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Prompts Debate on NIMS, Unified 
Response, Emergency Mgmt. (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.icyte.com/system/snapshots/fs1/ 
c/4/b/8/c4b8dd4e4209a32417d138cedf77c01a59fd76c0/index.html?anno_id=327017. 
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stronger command authority,61 and criticized EPA’s lack of regulatory 
energy in oil spill prevention and response.62 
C. Dangerous Dispersants: Regulators Bowing to Industry 
 EPA’s continued failure to scrutinize and regulate dispersants has 
been a critical element in the shortcomings of national spill response.63 
Dispersants, in fact, provide one of the most significant examples of 
dysfunctional contingency response mechanisms in the di-polar man-
agement of oil industry risk. Despite warnings from the Alaska Com-
mission twenty years previously,64 industry-led contingency planning 
and government acquiescence resulted in vigorous and indiscriminate 
use of dispersants in response to oil spills, rather than mechanical sur-
face collection technologies—booms and skimmer craft, which are 
more effective and less destructive to human and ecological health, but 
more expensive to maintain and operate.65 
 As the consequences of the BP Deepwater blowout continue to be 
revealed, the previously unfamiliar word “dispersant” may well achieve 
the same kind of public-awareness notoriety as the once-unknown 
“chad.”66 Dispersants were targeted by the Alaska Commission as 
deeply problematic, but are nonetheless strongly favored by industry 
for a variety of salient reasons. Dispersants are cheaper in terms of out-
of-pocket costs to the spiller than removal actions.67 Perhaps even more 
compelling, dispersants are “optically” preferable: they play a key role 
                                                                                                                      
61 Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 156 (Recommendation 39). 
62 Id. at 157 (Recommendation 40). 
63 Riki Ott, Sound Truth and Corporate Myth$: The Legacy of the Exxon Val-
dez Oil Spill 422–27 (2005). The necessity, and shortcomings, of EPA’s scrutiny of dis-
persants are analyzed at length in Dr. Riki Ott’s major compilation of post-Exxon Valdez 
Oil Spill accounting. See id. 
64 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 198–99. 
65 See Vsevolod Tatarenkov, The Marine Spill Response Corporation: A Closer Look, 
D.102, at 2–3 (Nov. 5, 2010) (unpublished research memorandum), available at http://www. 
bc.edu/environmentallaw (follow “Boston College Law School Land & Environmental Law 
Program Submission to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
and Offshore Drilling” hyperlink). 
66 See, e.g., Bryan Walsh, Oil Spill: What’s Going on Under the Gulf?, Time (Aug. 2, 2010, 6:55 
PM), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2010/08/02/oil-spill-whats-going-on-under-the-gulf/; 
HBO’s “Recount” Revists the Hanging Chad, NPR (May 25, 2008), http://www.npr.org/tem- 
plates/story/story.php?storyId=90813445. 
67 See Dagmar Schmidt Etkin, Cutter Info. Corp., Estimating Cleanup Costs For 
Oil Spills 5 (1999), available at http://www.environmental-research.com/publications/pdf/ 
1999-IOSC-Cost.pdf. 
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in the “out-of-sight, out-of-mind” response strategy.68 If oil can be sunk 
beneath the surface and broken up into billions of small suspended 
droplets, it becomes invisible, lessens the images of fouled beaches and 
dying wildlife, and its existence can be doubted and denied.69 By dis-
charging a torrent of dispersants a mile below the surface, the objective 
is to prevent much of the oil from ever reaching visibility at the surface. 
However, if oil does reach the shore, dispersants can, to some extent, 
achieve surface cleaning.70 In Alaska, high-pressure spraying of dispers-
ants on stony beaches was a major objective for Exxon in creating news 
video of successful post-spill cleanup.71 
 But dispersants have serious destructive effects when released into 
the environment, and not just for wildlife. In Alaska, temporary work-
ers hired to spray dispersants on Prince William Sound and on the 
beaches reported a litany of physical effects from exposure to back-
spray.72 “We’re peeing blood,” the author was told, “we can’t let the 
foremen know or they’ll send us home to Texas, but if it’s doing this to 
us, what’s it doing to the places we’re spraying?”73 In Alaska today, 
beaches that had been sprayed with dispersants reportedly demonstrate 
greater continued ecological damage than beaches that were never 
“cleaned.”74 Down on the Gulf of Mexico there are not only reports of 
dolphins dying with bloody hemorrhages around their blowholes and 
in their internal organs, but dispersant workers have started to pass 
blood in their urine, as well.75 
                                                                                                                      
68 See Rocky Kistner, Dispersant Controversy, Oil Plumes Persist in the Gulf, Switchboard: 
Nat. Resources Def. Council Staff Blog (Aug. 20, 2010), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/ 
blogs/rkistner/down_a_winding_road_that.html. 
69 See Matthew Brown, Underwater Oil Plumes Disputed by BP CEO Tony Hayward, Huff-
ington Post (May 30, 2010, 8:55 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/30/ 
underwater-oil-plumes-dis_n_595015.html. 
70 Int’l Tanker Owners Pollution Fed’n Ltd, Technical Information Paper: The 
Use of Chemical Dispersants to Treat Oil Spills 5 (2005), available at http://www. 
itopf.com/_assets/documents/tip4.pdf. 
71 Plater, supra note 3, at 11,044. 
72 See Ott, supra note 63, at 29, 32–33. 
73 Interview with oil clean-up worker in Valdez, Alaska (Aug. 19, 1989). 
74 Interview with Riki Ott, toxicologist and author, in La. (Aug. 9, 2010). 
75 See Hannah Rogers-Ganter et al., Recommendations for Better Protecting Human 
Health in the Wake of Offshore Oil Spills, D.121, at 2 (Nov. 5, 2010) (unpublished research 
memorandum), available at http://www.bc.edu/environmentallaw (follow “Boston College 
Law School Land & Environmental Law Program Submission to the National Commission on 
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling” hyperlink); Maryann Tobin, 2010 
Oil Spill: Dolphins Suffer Internal Bleeding, Rescued Birds Fly Back to Oil Spill From Tampa, Exam-
iner ( June 8, 2010, 12:12 AM), http://www.examiner.com/animal-welfare-in-tampa-bay/ 
2010-oil-spill-dolphins-suffer-internal-bleeding-rescued-birds-fly-back-to-oil-spill-from-tampa. 
2011] Lessons Lost: Megasystems in Alaska & the Gulf 407 
 Dispersants in the water column not only kill marine mammals, 
fish, and other larger life forms, but may have even greater long-term 
ecosystem effects. The BP Deepwater Horizon blowout occurred at the 
Gulf of Mexico’s season of maximum larval production for fish, shell-
fish, and the myriad smaller life forms that support the fecundity of the 
Gulf.76 Dispersants make the oil miscible, hanging in subsurface curtain 
plumes of tiny droplets of heavy oil-cum-dispersant that can directly con-
taminate or be consumed by whatever they touch.77 “Clouds of larva, 
billions, even trillions of them, are drifting in that water column,” a fed-
eral biologist told the author.78 “They move up and down according to 
temperature and light, and when they hit those plumes of suspended 
subsurface oil, it’s all over for them.”79 The genetic damage to ecosys-
tems in Alaska is still tangible. Herring populations and the major 
Alaska herring fishery have never recovered,80 and Prince William 
Sound’s primary pod of orca killer whales has not had a successful re-
production since the spill.81 If the Alaska Commission’s recommenda-
tions had been heeded it is likely that dispersants would play no part, or 
                                                                                                                      
76 William R. Freudenburg & Robert Gramling, Blowout in the Gulf: The BP 
Oil Spill Disaster and the Future of Energy in America 12 (2011). 
77 David Biello, Massive Oil Plume Confirmed in Gulf of Mexico, Sci. Am. (Aug. 19, 2010), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=masive-oil-plume-confirmed-in-gulf-of-
mexico. 
78 Telephone Interview with federal biologist in Fla. ( June, 2010) (interview was con-
fidential). 
79 Id. 
80 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Tr. Council, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Restoration 
Plan: 2010 Update—Injured Resources and Services 27–29 (2010), available at http:// 
www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universal/Documents/Publications/2010IRSUpdate.pdf. 
81 Brandon Keim, Unique Killer-Whale Pod Doomed by Exxon Valdez, Wired Sci. (Mar. 24, 
2009, 11:45 AM), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/03/valdezwhales/. In light of 
the extremely long-term latencies in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez, and current reports 
of continuing major die-offs in the Gulf, it is difficult to sustain the contention made by Ken-
neth Feinberg, Administrator of the BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster Victim Compensation 
Fund, and others, that the vast majority of harms from the BP spill will essentially have been 
realized in one more year’s time, by 2012. See Catherine Clifford, Gulf Oil Spill Victims Offered 3 
Years’ Damages, CNNMoney.com (Feb. 2, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/02/small 
business/bp_claims_feinberg_final_payments/index.htm (Feinberg’s facility “predicted that 
the region will fully recover from the disaster in 2012,” with the possible exception of oyster 
harvesting, which was granted four years of damages). Cf. Suzanne Goldenburg, Has BP 
Really Cleaned up the Gulf Oil Spill?, Guardian (London), Apr. 13, 2011, http://www.guard- 
ian.co.uk/environment/2011/apr/13/deepwater-horizon-gulf-mexico-oil-spill (“In the past 
year, [marine scientist Samantha] Joye—as well as other independent scientists—has repeat-
edly challenged the official version of the oil disaster put forward by the White House and 
other administration officials. . . . In December, Joye’s team knocked down another White 
House claim—that the vast majority of the oil was gone—when she discovered a thick coating 
of oil, dead starfish and other organisms on the bottom of the ocean, over an area of 2,900 
square miles.”) 
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a significantly reduced role, in spill response. Instead, spill response 
would focus on adoption of advanced skimmer oil capture technology,82 
nontoxic coagulants that can operate in the subsurface water column as 
well as on the surface,83 high-volume separation and retrieval systems,84 
and even short-term combustion approaches,85 in addition to greatly 
enhanced prevention.86 But it was not to be. 
 Today, as EPA has quite belatedly hastened to test an array of dis-
persants, the Agency’s tentative conclusions about dispersant toxicity 
are cast into grave doubt by the Alaska experience. Tested dispersants 
appear in most cases to have been subjected only to short-term, high-
dose acute toxicity tests of the dispersant alone, rather than completing 
the normal range of tests for toxicity, capabilities, and efficacy,87 with 
inconsistency in testing the dispersant and oil mixture—the form in 
which the substances occur in impacted waters.88 
                                                                                                                      
 
82 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 105–06. Some scientists have argued 
that it is preferable and less damaging to keep the oil on the surface. If oil stays on the 
surface rather than mixing deep in the water column it is retrievable by the kind of effec-
tive surface technology currently used in Europe; if submerged by dispersants then the oil 
cannot be retrieved. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Admon, NOLA Steel, Inc. (Nov. 10, 
2010) (discussing Dutch North Sea skimmer boom arm technology in North Sea opera-
tions); see also Eli Kintisch, Gulf Oil Spill: An Audacious Decision in Crisis Gets Cautious Praise, 
Science, Aug. 13, 2010, at 735, 736 (“NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco says one of 
the worst case scenarios involving longer exposures due to dispersed oil—big losses of 
spawning bluefin tuna populations—may not be detectable for years. That’s led some sci-
entists to suggest that letting the oil rise to the surface would have been a better move, as it 
could be more easily collected.”). 
83 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 107. 
84 See id. at 105–06, 197. 
85 See id. at 125. 
86 See id. at 127. 
87 See Juliet Eilperin, Oil Dispersant Does Not Pose Environmental Threat, Early EPA Findings 
Suggest, Wash. Post, June 30, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti- 
cle/2010/06/30/AR2010063004358.html. HPV Chemical Hazard Data Availability Study, Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/hpv/pubs/general/hazchem.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 
2010) (“There are six basic tests which have been internationally agreed to for screening 
high production volume (HPV) chemicals for toxicity. The tests agreed to under the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Screening Information Data Set 
(OECD/SIDS) program are: acute toxicity; chronic toxicity; developmental/reproductive 
toxicity; mutagenicity; ecotoxicity and environmental fate.”). Testing that uses only acute 
toxicity parameters does not give reliable data on real world toxicity. Interview with Riki Ott, 
supra note 74. 
88 Studies have demonstrated that the mixture of crude oil and dispersant is more 
toxic than either the dispersant or crude oil by themselves. See Robert A. Perkins et al., 
Comparative Marine Toxicity Testing: A Cold-Water Species and Standard Warm-Water Test Species 
Exposed to Crude Oil and Dispersant, 42 Cold Regions Sci. & Tech. 226, 227 (2005). Even 
low-dose exposures to chemicals can be very dangerous. See generally Nicholas A. Ashford 
& Claudia S. Miller, Chemical Exposures: Low Levels and High Stakes 3–10 (2d ed. 
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 A number of oil industry contingency response functions in the 
Gulf of Mexico, as in Alaska, are consigned under official contingency 
response plans to industry-created service organizations.89 In the Gulf of 
Mexico, primary dependence is placed upon industry-created pooled 
response management corporations—the Marine Preservation Associa-
tion (MPA) and the Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC)—and 
these entities tend to adopt procedures and technology that serve indus-
try agendas rather than public interests.90 The delegation of official 
functions to private entities creates inherent tensions—between serving 
the avowed civic public goals of maximizing safety and effective inci-
dent response on one hand, and the pressing business agendas of the 
industry partners on the other. Financial interest, media-management 
interests, and market ratings measured in quarterly performances all 
militate in favor of narrowed goals and strategies, for example, the con-
tinuing use of dispersants.91 This problematic internal culture figured 
heavily in the Alaska Commission’s conclusions and recommendations 
and is directly and problematically presented in Gulf of Mexico opera-
tions, and in contingency response planning with industry-constituted 
risk and response management corporations. 
 In both Gulf megasystems, industry pressure and agency lassitude 
combined to lessen operational vigilance and risk-preventing design, 
and to undercut the preparation and implementation of effective re-
sponses when disaster struck. 
III. RCACs: An Innovative Expansion Beyond the Traditional  
Di-Polar Model, and Challenges Encountered 
 Of the fifty-nine commission recommendations in the wake of the 
Exxon Valdez, heavy industry lobbying during passage of OPA-90 
                                                                                                                      
1998), available at http://drclaudiamiller.com/Articles/Chemical_Exposures_Low_Levels_ 
and_High_Stakes_2nd_Ed.pdf. Additionally, for clean-up workers from the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill, “[m]oderate chemical exposure was also associated with a greater reported preva-
lence of chronic airway disease and symptoms of multiple chemical sensitivity.” Annie K. 
O’Neill, Self-Reported Exposures and Health Status Among Workers from the Exxon Val-
dez Oil Spill Cleanup, at iv (2003) (unpublished MPH thesis, Yale University), available at 
http://rikiott.com/pdf/oneill_thesis.pdf. 
89 See, e.g., Home, Marine Spill Response Corp., http://www.msrc.org (last visited Apr. 
15, 2011); Why MPA, Marine Preservation Ass’n, http://www.mpaz.org (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011). In both areas, the primary funders and providers of response equipment and opera-
tions are often industry entities. See Tatarenkov, supra note 65, at 1. 
90 See id. at 2; Becoming a Customer, Marine Spill Response Corp., http://www.msrc.org/ 
Membership.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
91 See Tatarenkov, supra note 65, at 3–4. 
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blocked or diluted many of these recommendations.92 The emerging 
story of Gulf of Mexico deepwater drilling frustratingly reflects how 
beneficial it might have been if those Alaskan recommendations had 
been implemented nationally in the wake of the Exxon Valdez. 
 Beyond its recommendations for comprehensive prevention policy 
and operational safety commitments,93 the Alaska Oil Spill Commission 
urged that government and corporate performance standards should 
specifically require BAT—best available technology, a fundamentally 
rational suggestion that could have made a significant difference in the 
Gulf of Mexico.94 The Alaska Commission also recommended that en-
hanced state and local regulatory involvement be encouraged rather 
than preempted.95 Recommendations at the federal level included calls 
for mandatory corporate safety reporting, minmum personnel levels, 
revised insurance antitrust exemptions, and an intensified vigilance 
role for the Coast Guard.96 
 In addition to seeking “regulatory vigilance in government agen-
cies” and “corporate attitudes that put safety first,” a prime innovation of 
the Alaska Commission, only partially integrated into OPA-90, was the 
proposed creation of institutionalized citizen watchdog councils— 
RCACs.97 These councils, made up of citizens representing interests that 
would be grievously harmed if risk-prevention and incident response 
measures fail, aim to break up tendencies toward complacency, collu-
sion, and neglect within the industry-agency management model that 
characterizes the field.98 Integrated into several Commission recom-
mendations,99 this structural reform innovation in effect pluralized the 
                                                                                                                      
 
92 See generally Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified at 
33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–3207 (2006). 
93 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 129–32. 
94 See id. at 135 (Recommendation 7). 
95 See id. at 137–39 (Recommendation 11). An expressed congressional intent not to 
preempt state and local regulatory action would avoid the industry arguments that under-
cut Alaska’s protective regulations in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond. See No. A 77-195, 
1978 A.M.C. 1697, 1712–14 (D. Alaska June 30, 1978), rev’d, Chevron U.S.A., et al. v. 
Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 501 (9th Cir. 1984). The Commission also noted the particular 
utility of interstate compacts. Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 142 (Recommen-
dation 18). 
96 Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 149–51 (Recommendations 31–33). 
97 See id. at 139–40, 186. 
98 Id. at app. M, at 6–9. In framing its citizen council recommendations, the Commis-
sion was building upon the suggestions of Rick Steiner, former Professor at the University 
of Alaska, Anchorage. Plater, supra note 3, at 11,046. 
99 Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 131 (”Recommendation 3: Citizen knowledge 
of risk. Because many individuals and communities are placed at risk by modern oil transporta-
tion systems, citizens should be involved in oversight arrangements at every level of govern-
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di-polar governance model. Citizen councils would strategically institu-
tionalize a functional, informed viewpoint on operations and risk from 
the external perspective of potentially impacted members of the public. 
 RCACs—authorized in OPA-90100 but limited to Alaska waters by 
Capitol lobbying101—have become a significant but largely unheralded 
product of the Exxon Valdez disaster. The RCAC model could well be 
integrated into a post-Deepwater Horizon management system for the 
Gulf and other oil production areas. 
 Currently there are two RCACs in existence in the United States, 
both of which are independent but industry-funded: the Prince William 
Sound RCAC (PWS-RCAC) and the Cook Inlet RCAC (CI-RCAC).102 
For over twenty years, both the PWS-RCAC and the CI-RCAC have ad-
dressed environmental protection and oil spill preparation within their 
respective communities with little recognition from the outside world103 
and varying degrees of success.104 
 OPA-90 stipulates that industry funding for the Alaska RCACs is a 
basic requirement for the validity of contingency plans in the waters 
they serve.105 The PWS-RCAC is funded on an annual basis by the own-
ers or operators of terminal facilities and tankers operating in Prince 
William Sound at a price-adjusted budget of up to $2 million.106 The 
CI-RCAC receives funding up to $1 million.107 
                                                                                                                      
 
ment.”); id. at 139 (“Recommendation 12: Oversight council. A citizens advisory council should 
be established in the Office of the Governor and given responsibility for overseeing the safe 
transportation of oil, gas and other hazardous substances.”); id. at 146 (“Recommendation 26: 
Regional advisory committees. A system of regional advisory councils should be formalized 
under state authority to oversee harbor administration, state and federal regulation and private 
safety functions.”); id. at 163 (“Recommendation 49: Enlarged community role. A substantive 
role should be given to the affected communities in any response system.”). 
100 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d) (2006). 
101 Id. § 2732(b), (d) (authorizing the creation of two RCACs only in Alaska). It is of 
course difficult to pin down the intrigues of Capitol lobbying, but Alaska Commission Ex-
ecutive Director Havelock, who went to Washington while OPA-90 was being debated in 
Congress, said that given the lobbying that accompanied the legislation, it is reasonable to 
assume that it was the lobbying that resulted in RCACs not being extended to regions be-
yond Alaska. Interview with John E. Havelock, supra note 27. 
102 See Horton, supra note 17, at 2. 
103 A study by George Busenberg appears to be the only serious analysis of the RCAC 
form. See generally George Busenberg, Citizen Advisory Councils and Environmental Man-
agement in the Marine Oil Trade (1997) (unpublished technical report based on Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), available at http://www.circac. 
org/documents/pdf/emc/CACEnvironMg.pdf. 
104 See id. at 65 (identifying factors which affect the success of RCACs). 
105 33 U.S.C. § 2732(k)(1). 
106 Id. § 2732(k)(2). A provision in subsection (o)(1) permitted oil companies to sat-
isfy the requirements of the Act if they entered contracts that met specific funding and 
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A. RCAC Achievements 
 Over the past twenty years, each RCAC has achieved significant ac-
complishments in improving oil spill prevention and limiting the envi-
ronmental impact of the oil industry within the region. Their achieve-
ments include: PWS-RCAC research and public advocacy resulting in 
tanker escort tug requirements to enhance safe transit through the 
Sound’s narrow passages;108 research, advocacy, and funding for radar 
system enhancement to detect icebergs within the Sound;109 research 
and advocacy leading to the installation of vapor controls to reduce air 
pollution hazards at tanker loading wharves;110 co-development of 148 
geographic response strategies (GRSs) for protection plans for envi-
ronmentally sensitive areas in Prince William Sound and Kodiak;111 re-
search and advocacy to understand and minimize the threat of non-
indigenous marine organisms reaching Prince William Sound in oil 
tanker ballast water;112 and general monitoring of terminal operations 
and contingency planning.113 Officers and members of the RCAC have 
a regular presence in discussions with industry and agency officials.114 In 
addition, the PWS-RCAC has, on a number of occasions, served as the 
confidential broker of whistleblowers’ factual tips from within the indus-
try and government agencies.115 CI-RCAC has helped to shape forty-
three GRSs tailored to protect specific sensitive areas within Cook Inlet 
and Kodiak Island from impacts following a spill, and created a photo-
                                                                                                                      
duration requirements with alternative advisory groups certified by the President to foster 
the general goals and purposes of the Act and to serve the communities and interest 
groups in the vicinity of the oil terminals. Id. § 2732(o)(1). The PWS-RCAC serving today 
is of that alternative advisory group form. Id. 
107 Id. § 2732(k)(3). 
108 Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, What We’ve Ac-
complished 10 (2004), available at http://www.pwsrcac.org/docs/d0013400.pdf. 
109 Press Release, Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, Prince Wil-
liam Sound Iceberg Radar Project Comes Online (Dec. 20, 2002), available at http://www. 
pwsrcac.org/newsroom/021220.html. 
110 Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, supra note 108, at 11. 
111 Joe Banta, 5 Questions About Oil Spills, Sea Briefs, Summer 2010, at 2, available at 
http://www.masgc.org/pdf/masgp/10-012-02.pdf. 
112 Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, supra note 108, at 12. 
113 Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, PWS-RCAC Bro-
chure 6 (2004), available at http://www.pwsrcac.org/docs/d0013400.pdf. 
114 Banta, supra note 111, at 2. 
115 “We get a lot of information from people, it’s given to our staff, and we pass it on, 
but we don’t give out the names.” Telephone Interview with Walter Parker, Board Presi-
dent, PWS-RCAC (Feb. 20, 2011). 
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graphic baseline of the Cook Inlet coast at low tide as, among other 
functions, a potential aid to oil spill first responders.116 
 The Obama Administration, the Gulf Commission, and coastal 
communities in the Gulf area have recognized and discussed the poten-
tial utility of an RCAC structure for the Gulf region.117 Based on the 
National Commission’s recommendations, it is possible that upcoming 
amendments to OPA-90 will include a broadened authorization for 
RCACs on the Gulf and other national coastlines subject to drilling.118 
 Had there been a Gulf RCAC, with representatives from inshore 
and offshore commercial fisheries, sport fishing, tourism, and recrea-
tion sectors, it is unlikely that the recent rarefied technology of deepwa-
ter drilling would have been issued a permit without an environmental 
review, acknowledgment of the potential for spills reaching beaches 
and shores, a practicable contingency plan, basic geological data from 
BP, or even consideration of the possibility of a blowout. Institutional-
ized representation of at-risk citizen interests and communities creates 
a dramatic change in the “low level of vigilance and a discomforting 
level of comfort between the industry and . . . regulators.”119 
B. Challenges Posed by the RCAC Format 
 The Alaska experience, however, has demonstrated some intrinsic 
challenges to effective representation of societal interests external to di-
polar industry-agency governance. First is the lack of subpoena 
                                                                                                                      
116 Horton, supra note 17, at 3; see Coastal Habitat Mapping, Cook Inlet Reg'l Citizens’ 
Advisory Council, http://www.circac.org/joomla/index.php?option=com_content& view= 
category&layout=blog&id=18&Itemid=33 (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
117 See BP Commission Report, supra note 3, at 212, 268, 281; Banta, supra note 111, at 
2–3; Bill Capo, Gulf Coast Residents Learn the Lessons from Exxon Valdez, WWLTV.com (Aug. 10, 
2010, 5:32 PM), http://www.wwltv.com/video/featured-videos/Gulf-Coast-residents-learn-
the-lessons-from-Exxon-Valdez-100078984.html; Rhonda McBride, Prince William Sound Coun-
cil May be First of Many, KTUU.com ( Jan. 20, 2011, 7:24 PM), http://www.ktuu.com/ 
news/ktuu-prince-william-sound-citizens-01202011,0,5301633.story. 
118 See BP Commission Report, supra note 3, at 212 (“Local citizen support is impor-
tant. . . . Any structure should therefore include a citizens’ advisory council to provide 
formal advice and a direct line to citizens’ concerns.”); see also id. at 268–69 (“In the Gulf, 
such a council should broadly represent the citizens’ interests in the area, such as fishing 
and tourism, and possibly include representation from oil and gas workers as ex-officio, 
non-voting members. The citizens’ group could be funded by Gulf lease holders. The 
Commission further recommends that federal regulators be required to consult with the 
council on relevant issues, that operators provide the council with access to records and 
other information . . . .”). In its report to the President, the National Commission makes 
numerous such recommendations that would require Congress to supply further authority 
and funding under the OPA-90 framework. See id. at 184–85. 
119 Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 186; see Horton, supra note 17, at 1. 
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power.120 Lobbyists in Congress successfully blocked subpoena authority 
for the RCACs in OPA-90, just as they blocked the grant of subpoena 
power for the current National Commission.121 Funding issues arise an-
nually for CI-RCAC, which has to negotiate with the industry combine 
to justify its budget each year.122 For a structural entity created to scruti-
nize industry and agency practices from an external public perspective, 
it is anomalous to require the scrutinizer to negotiate budget item ap-
proval from those being scrutinized. 
 Further, there has been strong evidence of RCAC co-optation in 
                                                                                                                     
the case of CI-RCAC.123 The PWS-RCAC, on the other hand, is almost 
entirely composed of citizen representatives who are inclined to ex-
treme caution about risk.124 Prince William Sound citizens and local 
communities are not deeply tied to the oil industry as many in the 
Cook Inlet area are, but rather to fishing and natural resources— liveli-
hoods which are directly threatened by oil spills.125 In Cook Inlet, how-
ever, the coastal communities are much more heavily dependent on oil 
payrolls,126 and oil-industry-dependent community officials sitting on 
that RCAC have consistently blunted the inquiries and risk-monitoring 
functions of the Council.127 De facto co-optation of council members 
can eliminate the independent perspective and therapeutic value of a 
citizen watchdog council, and collapse the external eye of the innova-
tive citizen council model back into the old di-polar establishment. The 
politics of the CI-RCAC municipalities is strongly influenced by short 
 
120 See Plater, supra note 3, at 11,046. 
121 See id.; John M. Broder, Investigator Finds No Evidence That BP Took Shortcuts to Save 
Money, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2010, at A16; Siobhan Hughes & Ryan Dezember, Oil-Spill Panel 
Pushes for Subpoena Power, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 2010, at A8. 
122 See Naomi Klouda, CIRCAC Removes Shavelson, Homer Trib., Sept. 8, 2010, http:// 
homertribune.com/2010/09/circac-removes-shavelson/. 
123 See id. 
124 See Horton, supra note 17, at 4. 
125 See Valdez Impacts, Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n, http://www.aoga.org/facts-and-figures/ 
valdez/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2011) (showing that in 2007 the largest employer and largest 
industry within the Valdez Cordova Borough region was the fishing industry, accounting for 
significantly more direct jobs than the regional oil industry, and that the oil and gas industry 
contributed only $53.4 million in payroll to the local residents, including all related busi-
nesses). 
126 See Kenai Impacts, Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n, http://www.aoga.org/facts-and-figures/ 
kenai/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2011) (showing that in 2007 gas and oil production within 
Kenai Peninsula Borough, where Cook Inlet is located, accounted for 4603 oil and gas 
related jobs within the region, and $262.3 million in payroll to local residents—revealing 
that the largest employer in the region is the state government). 
127 See Klouda, supra note 122; Frank Mullen, Editorial, CIRCAC’s Time Has Passed, 
Homer Trib. (Sept. 22, 2010), http://homertribune.com/2010/09/circac%E2%80%99s- 
time-has-passed/; Horton, supra note 17, at 4. 
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term maximization of oil industry economic benefits, and tends to de-
fer to the authority of corporate managers.128 
 If there is a realistic risk that citizens’ watchdog councils will be co-
pte
g the presence of independent at-risk citizen moni-
rs,
Conclusion 
 In the aftermath of the Gulf of Mexico BP Deepwater Horizon 
blowout spill, the American governance system has the opportunity to 
                                                                                                                     
o d or suborned by pressures from the predominating industry or 
agency establishments that the councils are designed to monitor and 
counter-balance, the RCAC structure can be neutered. If industry or 
agency whistleblowers who need confidentiality in passing publicly sig-
nificant information to an RCAC know that the council has member-
ship allied to their employers, the information-brokering role of the 
RCAC is nullified. The composition of RCACs thus must be constituted 
to assure their independence and critical external public perspective, 
leading to suggestions that citizen membership cannot be aligned with 
the di-polar establishments that the council entity is designed to 
counter-balance.129 
 Institutionalizin
to  funded by the implicated industries, fundamentally changes the 
centripetal tendency of di-polar industry-agency structures, opening 
them to transparency, increased compliance, and care-enhancing pub-
lic awareness. Adding this third leg to the di-polar default format for 
governance shifts the governmental geometry toward a Jeffersonian 
multicentric pluralism, where affected interests that were previously 
marginalized now are able to be actively involved in the governance 
process.130 The new triangulation created by RCACs and other third-
party empowerments can help avoid losing public and individual values 
in the tangles of the traditionally insulated di-polar political-economic 
marketplace. 
 
128 See Klouda, supra note 122; Mullen, supra note 127. 
129 See Horton, supra note 17, at 1. This memorandum suggested that, as in various pol-
lution regulatory boards, membership can exclude direct and indirect representatives of 
the regulated entities. Id. at 5. Precedent for this proposition comes from the federal pol-
lution statutes and cases like Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors of San Mateo County.   
97 Cal. Rptr. 431, 439 (Ct. App. 1971) (“‘It is an age-old principle of our law that no man 
should judge or otherwise officially preside over disputed matters in which he has a pecu-
niary interest. The rule is given expression in the law of trusts. It is against public policy to 
permit any person occupying fiduciary relations to be placed in such a position that he 
may be tempted to betray his duty as a trustee.’” (quoting Sims v. Petaluma Gaslight Co., 
63 P. 1011, 1012 (Cal. 1901))). 
130 See Horton, supra note 17, at 1. 
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harvest conclusions about hy did this calamity hap-
n?
                                                                                                                     
causation— “w
pe ” —and about necessary fundamental changes in how we manage 
the extraction and transport of oil in the future. Poised against this cor-
rective agenda is the natural tendency of the industry, and the commu-
nities that depend economically upon it, to avert systemic changes that 
will potentially constrain on-going economic patterns. 
 Vivid disasters create practical possibilities for systemic improve-
ment, but only if systemic flaws are publicly perceived and systemic les-
sons learned. The Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, and the State of 
laskA a Oil Spill Commission Report of 1990, distilled some highly sig-
nificant perceptions and recommendations for systemic improve-
ments,131 but many did not translate into the federal OPA-90 legislation 
passed in response to the public dismay at the Alaska calamity. 132 
Those that were included tended to become suborned by the culture of 
complacency, collusion, and neglect that the Alaska Commission had 
identified as the precondition and cause of that disaster.133 
 The Gulf of Mexico trauma presents yet another opportunity to 
learn from disaster. The on-going work of the National Commission 
shows hopeful signs of not squandering the learning-teaching mo-
en 134m t.  And if there is to be a fundamental change in the current 
megasystem with its systemic deficiencies, it makes good sense to have 
the megasystem of the future include the structural innovation of an 
active citizen participant counterweight within the governance struc-
ture itself, to serve the public interest better this time around as we 
await an ultimately necessary shift away from fossil fuels. 
 
131 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 129–69. 
132 See Plater, supra note 3, at 11,407. 
133 See id. 
134 See generally BP Commission Report, supra note 3, at 1–86 (analyzing the systemic 
failures which contributed to the disaster in the Gulf). 
